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Abstract
In this article the author examines the relationship between paternalism and childhood obesity. In 
particular he examines the risks of paternalistic intervention in order to prevent or curtail the occur-
rence of obesity among young children.
   Read responses to this article  
Voight, I. (2012). Childhood Obesity and Restrictions of Parental Liberty. Democracy & Education, 
20(1). Article 8. Available online at http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol20/iss1/8. 
Peterson, B. (2012). Maternalism as a Viable Alternative to the Risks Imposed by Paternalism. 
Democracy & Education, 20(1). Article 9. Available online at http://democracyeducationjournal.org/
home/vol20/iss1/9. 
   Submit your own response to this article 
Submit online at democracyeducationjournal.org/home
The preventive function of government . . . is far more liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, than 
the punitory [sic] function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate exercise of freedom of action and 
a human being which would not admit of being represented, and fairly, too, as increasing the facilities for 
some form or other of delinquency. (Mill, 1978, p. 95)
Obesity describes an abnormally high fat accumulation that impairs health. It is crudely measured by a body mass index (BMI) of greater 
than 30 kg/sq meters. That is to say, if a person’s weight in kilograms 
divided by height in meters equals 30 or more, that person may be 
considered medically obese. The BMI for being overweight is 25kg/
sq meters.
Obesity now ranks among the highest of concerns by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and not only in countries of 
affluence; the figures of obesity worldwide have doubled since 1980 
and the problem can now commonly be found in low- and middle- 
income countries, especially in urban centers. The figures that map 
the steady rise of obesity across continents are staggering: between 
20-24% of adults in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, 
Iceland and Luxembourg are officially obese. In Mexico and the 
United States the figure now tops 30% (OECD 2010).1
The correlation between poverty and obesity should not 
surprise us: Poorer people are generally less well educated than are 
those who have money to spend on quality private education or 
housing in a district that provides quality public education and 
have less access to reliable health information and to preventative 
health care. Further, unable to afford more expensive and healthy 
food, poorer people generally purchase processed foods with high 
concentrations of fat, salt, and sugars. Conversely, wealthier and 
better educated people are more likely to carefully monitor their 
caloric intake, to exercise regularly, and to belong to social net-
works that do the same. They are able to sustain healthy eating 
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habits by having on average more leisure time that allows them to 
invest in healthy food selection and to teach their children about 
thoughtful meal preparation, including using cookbooks or recipe 
websites by those advocating low- calorie food and reading popular 
authors, such as Eric Schlosser and Michael Pollan, who investigate 
the food industry.
The widespread availability of cheap and unhealthy food is no 
accident; rather, policy decisions facilitate its mass distribution and 
availability. For example, the American government invests 
billions in subsidies so that farmers grow corn; processed food 
made from corn starch supplies the basis for all kinds of inexpen-
sive and unhealthy foods. This includes food that routinely appears 
in American school lunch programs. Corporations, too, have a 
vested interest in targeting younger and younger consumers and 
invest billions both in advertising and product placement. The 
result is that millions are at greater risk of diabetes, cardiovascular 
diseases, and cancer. The health risks associated with obesity 
accrue not only for individuals but also for society, which must 
shoulder the exorbitant costs associated both with missed work-
days because of obesity- related illnesses as well as with health care 
for those whose obesity is causally related to a range of poor health 
outcomes. For WHO as well as a number of governments through-
out Europe and North America, the frontline of this battle against 
obesity is its occurrence in young children.
Taking all the research together, it is not difficult to under-
stand why the spread of obesity for many signals a need for more 
intervention from governments, particularly to protect the welfare 
of children. Efforts to address the epidemic that is child obesity 
take many forms. Many of these aim simply to supply and distrib-
ute reliable health information; they seek to construct better choice 
sets in order to facilitate the conditions and opportunities neces-
sary for sustaining well- being. These efforts aim to steer, direct, 
guide, and enable people to choose something better for them-
selves (see Thaler & Sustein, 2008). Often these efforts are labelled 
as paternalistic. The label is misleading, however. Paternalism does 
not merely entail attempts to guide or suggest. Rather, paternalism 
entails interference with the liberty of another for the purposes of 
promoting some good or preventing some harm, for the sake of the 
other person or for that of the person acting paternalistically. In 
this article I focus on paternalism so understood, and especially its 
relevance to the question of childhood obesity. I map out the basic 
contours of paternalism, followed by an analysis in which the 
purpose is to assess the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
paternalistic intervention in order to prevent or curtail the 
occurrence of obesity among young children.
The moral aim of paternalism is to act on behalf of the 
interests of others who presumably lack sufficient information or 
the resolve to inform and guide their actions. Such interference can 
be justified when people are treated with respect or when compel-
ling reasons for interference override basic liberty claims. Respect 
normally begins with the recognition that we must value another’s 
capacity for self- determination to the extent that it exists, or could 
exist. For example, because many citizens cannot be relied upon to 
always exercise their liberty responsibly, states behave paternalisti-
cally by imposing traffic laws, subjecting restaurants to periodic 
health inspections, forbidding the possession of certain weapons, 
and imposing building safety codes and environmental restric-
tions. And when parents fail to exercise their duties responsibly, 
they too are subject to state interference. In each of these cases, the 
justification seems fairly straightforward: Certain overriding 
factors— in particular public health and safety— trump the exercise 
of personal liberty, and these goods are therefore sufficient to 
justify the restriction of liberty.
Young children are therefore a special case. Given their limited 
emotional and cognitive development, as well as what Feinberg 
(1986) called their “right to an open future,” paternalism is typically 
necessary to secure a child’s immediate and future interests. Young 
children cannot be assumed to take responsibility for their own 
choices or health, let alone to understand their impact. For instance, 
elementary- school children may receive information about a 
balanced diet from their physical education teachers, yet be bom-
barded every day with advertisements for junk food and, moreover, 
encounter pizza, hot dogs, and hamburgers as the main menu items 
in their school cafeteria. Accordingly, most liberals justify paternal-
ism when a child’s well- being appears to be at stake.
Nevertheless, paternalism remains objectionable to many not 
only because of the way in which it generally interferes with 
individual liberty but also because of how it seems to infantilize us. 
As de Marneffe wrote, “In limiting our liberty for our own good, it 
seems that the government treats us like children or that it impedes 
our development into fully mature adults” (2006, p. 68). Again, this 
is because at the heart of paternalism there is interference, interfer-
ence of a coercive sort, even when it is justified on the basis on 
prevention from harm.
Now even strong libertarians hold that it is necessary to 
interfere with the liberty of another if the exercise thereof would 
have disastrous consequences, or when the exercise of liberty 
needlessly incurs harm on others. But while the interference with 
another’s liberty is not morally objectionable per se, three things 
must be stressed: (a) Coercive interference with the liberty of 
others requires strong justification; (b) affixing blame without 
regard to context is a losing strategy; (c) interference with the 
purpose of preventing harm is particularly subject to abuse— as the 
earlier quote from Mill explains.
When we come to the question of childhood obesity, there is 
broad consensus that it is unequivocally harmful. Moreover, not a 
few believe that parents— many of whom themselves are obese— are 
largely responsible for this harm. Accordingly, in many countries 
governments are aggressively stepping up their efforts to stamp out 
childhood obesity. For example, in 2009 34 states in the United States 
passed legislation on a range of issues from physical exercise, to 
healthy eating, to access to healthy food (Winterfeld, Shinkle, & 
Morandi, 2010). The general motivations clearly are to improve the 
health of young people, while the specific policy initiatives are to 
advise parents and ensure that there is adequate knowledge about 
and better access to a nutritional diet and exercise.
It is not difficult to assess what the harms of obesity are; many 
of these have already been mentioned. Nor is it difficult to deter-
mine the conditions under which obesity is likely to occur. Be that 
as it may, knowing precisely how to balance the liberty interests of 
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ordinary citizens against what many feel is a public health concern 
is very complex, as is determining the seriousness of obesity 
compared to other forms of harm. For example, is the harm caused 
by being obese analogous to being denied a blood transfusion or a 
decent education? Can it even remotely be compared to harm 
involving physical or psychological violence? Even if we dismiss the 
false analogies, recognizing that these represent criminal activity 
against others, to what other risky behavior will we compare 
obesity and will similar interventions be justified? What will such 
interventions portend with respect to basic liberties, particularly 
those that involve risk? Who will determine whether— let alone 
when— there is a crisis? Should intervention to avert harm occur in 
the absence of consent? However we answer these questions, the 
burdens of proof of harm and neglect for preventative interference 
are not trivial.
As I hope these preliminary comments show, the issues before 
us are not, as most liberals generally argue, simply about safeguard-
ing the interests of children. Nor are they, as most libertarians 
argue, merely about the liberty to do what one pleases without 
interference from others so long as the exercise of my freedom does 
not trespass against others. Contra the standard liberal argument, 
determining what the best interests of any child are is not a simple 
affair, even though it is rather easy to claim that a child’s best 
interests are paramount. Even so, the well- being of any particular 
child will vary in the details from one to the next. This is because 
beyond a basic set of conditions such as shelter, adequate nourish-
ment, relational intimacy, and physical safety, well- being is 
somewhat context- dependent. Contra the standard libertarian 
argument, the exercise of individual liberty is never absolute, and 
certainly not when the liberties of others are compromised. The 
exercise of any liberty must be checked against the interests of 
others. So I think it is a good idea if we push these two competing 
conceptions aside and explore the major dilemmas.
As I see it, the first dilemma is how to balance state paternal-
ism against the special privileges and relationships parents have 
with and toward their own children. When these conflict, who is to 
decide how they should be prioritized? Most parents are positioned 
to their children in unique ways. Mothers conceive, give birth, and 
raise children, knowing their needs and interests like few others 
ever could. Notwithstanding personal shortcomings and errors of 
judgment, most parents also unconditionally love their own 
children, nourishing them with affection and concern (albeit in a 
variety of ways), a gift no child protection or welfare service ever 
could satisfactorily supply. Nor could any competency test measure 
a parent’s love.
That said, parents do not possess rights to have or raise 
children, even if that is how most of us continue to think of it. 
Biology does not confer entitlement. Our relationship as parents to 
our own children is largely role- dependent, which means that we 
are charged with duties to care for our own children, and states 
have prerogatives to intervene when there is clear evidence of abuse 
or neglect. States, even liberal democratic ones, ascribe to 
themselves— legitimately or not— ultimate authority over the lives 
of citizens and when parents fail to meet their basic duties to their 
children, those adults effectively surrender their privileges. For 
example, child protection services can place abused or neglected 
children in foster care. States already possess the trump card.
Yet liberals routinely describe the state as a benevolent 
political entity whose infinite wisdom with respect to human affairs 
can be trusted to adjudicate between competing interests. But why 
should we take this for granted? After all, the state is not a collec-
tion of philosopher rulers, tried and tested through rigorous 
selection processes in a utopian state in which the family has been 
abolished. Rather, the state invariably consists of individuals with 
their own disputable interests, and many of these conflict with 
other values citizens are entitled to have. Of course, state officials 
are believed to possess competences with respect to the charges 
they are asked to carry out. Health officials presumably know more 
about health, secretaries of finance more about balanced budgets, 
and so forth. But agents of the state cannot simply be presumed to 
have the best interests of the public at heart. Here I need not indulge 
the temptation to say something about corruption. It will suffice to 
say that incompetence by state officials often leads to misdiagnosis 
and often dramatically worsens, rather than helps, the plight of 
those whose well- being is in question. Finally, states do not remain 
static from one moment in time to the next. Public attitudes shift 
according to circumstance and perceived threat, politicians with 
different attitudes and orientations are elected and deposed, and 
policies can be quickly turned on their head. So we would be naive 
to take a singularly optimistic view of the state, even when the 
so- called best interests of the child are the principal concern.
Consider compulsory school attendance laws: These were 
instituted with the aim of providing all children equal access and 
opportunities. Even so, German parents have been jailed simply for 
homeschooling their children, even when there was no evidence of 
harm (Spiegler 2003). Liberal states are not immune from behaving 
illiberally, regardless of what their stated motives are. (I shall say 
more about this shortly.) The point is this: Like parents, liberal states 
are quite capable of viewing persons instrumentally, not to mention 
exercising indiscriminate power over the lives of vulnerable subjects. 
So in saying that children are entitled to equal protection and that 
states have moral requirements to supply that protection, we have not 
solved the challenge of determining what the nature of the entitle-
ment is, nor what the scope of that requirement is.
This brings me to the second dilemma, namely the formula-
tion of risk and the harms of stigma. This concerns not only who 
gets to define risk but whose lives are directly affected by these 
one- sided discussions. Labelling children and families as being at 
risk often carries moralizing baggage that contributes to the 
perceived risk. It is no accident, for instance, that so many children 
from poor backgrounds end up in unchallenging classrooms where 
their label of being at risk results in their being recipients of 
condescending treatment and lowered expectations. A label often 
becomes a self- fulfilling prophesy. Risk does not only go in one 
direction, i.e., the direction that the so- called liberal state says it 
does. Families also incur risks when subject to arbitrary state 
oversight. Minority families in particular are at risk of highly 
discriminatory interference by a state that claims to know— 
without including the views of others— what is best. Indeed, 
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whenever the state decides that it will define what acceptable 
behavior is, it exercises power over the lives of others.
Let’s return for a moment to the parents of overweight or 
obese children, because the paternalist line of argument often 
assumes these children to be victims of bad parenting; this 
unarticulated assumption certainly is used to justify state interven-
tions that aim to curtail childhood obesity. But why start with the 
parents? Why not begin with the context in which all of us think 
and act, namely the broader culture in which we live? For starters, 
we have not even begun to address the socially unacceptable 
prejudices against overweight people, and until we do, all talk of 
intervention by the state with a view to protecting the best interests 
of children will remain one- sided.
Are the risks associated with childhood obesity strong enough 
to justify state interference in the lives of families? Is our concern 
about that analogous to concerns over sexual abuse, for instance? If it 
is, it remains a curious fact in Western societies that it is socially 
acceptable to openly ridicule and humiliate overweight persons with 
impunity. Indeed, unlike most other kinds of health risks, obesity is a 
condition that is already subject to social stigma. (For an historical 
overview of stigma attached to fatness in American public life, see 
Farrell, 2011). Such stigmas merely compound the difficulty many 
people already experience. If those who are overweight don’t first 
begin to loathe themselves, ridicule from others quickly turns to 
disgust and hatred, and these too often turn to violence. Children are 
especially vulnerable here. Overweight children are far more likely to 
be harassed, teased, bullied, and terrorized for no reason other than 
the shape of their bodies. And these effects of the prejudice are no 
different from those for people who suffer on account of their sexual 
orientation or the color of their skin.
Or consider the labor market, where overweight people are far 
more likely to be discriminated against than those who are 
considered average- sized or thin. The issue is serious enough that 
cities like Washington and San Francisco have passed legislation 
forbidding weight- based forms of discrimination that are every bit 
as serious as other forms of discrimination. It seems to me that 
these facts highlight another dimension to the problem that 
frequently goes unmentioned, namely that the attitudes and 
prejudices of the public— and here I do not hesitate to include 
higher educated people and the medical establishment— continue 
to countenance the public shaming and stigmatization of over-
weight people. In short, the prejudice against overweight people is 
widespread and troubling.
If I am right, then it is no thought experiment to imagine that 
interventions and competency tests (not unlike those wishing to 
adopt must meet; see LaFollette, 1980) for parents will proceed in 
much the same way that other kinds of paternalistic interventions 
do, targeting the poor generally and specific ethnic minorities in 
particular. Inasmuch as strong correlations between ethnic 
minority status, poverty, and obesity continue to persist, this 
outcome is not far- fetched. There is perhaps no easier way to 
quickly justify public alarm and subsequent state intervention than 
by stigmatizing some attribute of society’s weaker members. The 
advent of the following prejudice requires little imagination: 
Having failed to satisfy some ideal— in this case, good health— that 
more privileged members of society more easily maintain, poor 
parents cannot be relied upon to make responsible decisions for 
themselves or for their children.
Let’s come back to paternalism. As we have seen, paternalism 
involves interference with the liberty of others with the aim of 
promoting some good, and this commonly occurs during 
moments of perceived harm. But before there is harm there is risk 
of harm. There is risk both to one’s present and to one’s future 
health states, as well as risks to one’s general state of well- being. 
Accordingly, public health officials would like to see more done by 
the state to prevent harm from occurring in the first place. But 
attempts to prevent harm also entail risk, and those with medical 
degrees are not immune from criticism. Within my lifetime, and in 
the sincere belief that they were serving the public interest, 
so- called liberal states and their medical experts have sanctioned 
the infection of Black men with syphilis and the denial of treatment 
long after penicillin was discovered for the purposes of accurately 
recording their symptoms; they have smiled upon the eugenic 
sterilization of couples deemed unfit to bear children on the belief 
that the sterilization of the retarded or physically disabled would 
reduce suffering; they have diagnosed homosexuals as having a 
psychiatric illness on the belief that another’s sexual orientation 
can be a condition in need of a cure; they have sanctioned the 
banning of children with disabilities from school on the belief that 
to do so would be a waste of public expenditure and a detriment to 
the learning opportunities of so- called normal children.
It is well- known that widespread abuses of power— in particu-
lar by the medical establishment— led to an entire restructuring of 
laws and procedures (including the requirement of informed 
consent) that were put in place precisely to protect the innocent from 
paternalism run amok. The point is this: The coercive use of power is 
always justified as a prevention of risk by those wielding said power, 
be those risks to the state, to others, or to oneself. Yet when risk is 
defined unilaterally by people with tremendous power, other risks 
are incurred: risks to privacy, risks to family intimacy, risks to free 
choices over an individual’s own leisure time, etc. We might remem-
ber the words of Mill: “Wherever there is an ascendant class, a large 
portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class 
interests and its feelings of class superiority,” (1987, p. 6). We should 
be extremely wary of unilateral attempts by the state— even so- called 
liberal democratic states— to define the parameters of a child’s best 
interest and through policy and interventionist schemes to impose 
these on an unsuspecting public. The narrower the definition of best 
interest is, the more wary the public should be.
Clearly, if the state is to take a more proactive role in interfer-
ence with parental liberty, at a minimum some account is needed 
concerning what desirable preferences and behaviors are. Efforts to 
reduce risk entail drawing boundaries, and boundaries in ethics 
assume some conception of what is good or preferable. Yet when 
states draw boundaries and apply them to others in the form of 
laws, they restrict liberty by defining permissible risk. (I am not 
referring to the liberty of corporations or other political entities 
but to individual liberty.)
We might begin by offering an account of behaviors that 
should be forbidden, those that clearly violate basic freedoms and 
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welfare. Legal courts normally begin by addressing instances of 
abuse or neglect, but even with broad definitions in place and clear 
examples (e.g., sexual abuse) to illustrate what is impermissible, 
things quickly become very fuzzy. Interferences with parental 
liberty in cases involving obesity, even when it allegedly entails 
imminent harm, fall into this category. After all, cases of child 
obesity are not morally different from many other cases involving 
health risk. Therefore, to argue that the state must interfere with 
parental liberty in cases involving obesity begs a number of 
questions concerning why it is not also necessary to restrict other 
similarly risky behaviors.
But suppose that we were able to agree on some areas of risk 
(and this is easier said than done). What constitutes a risk? In its 
broadest sense, risk occurs the moment there is life: being born 
places us at risk; the air we breathe places us at risk; stepping onto 
trains or into automobiles places us at risk; eating food sprayed 
with pesticides places us at risk; climbing trees places us at risk; 
riding bicycles to work places us at risk; drinking water from a 
stream places us at risk; being in relationships places us at risk. In 
short, life is defined by risk, though we generally overestimate risk 
regarding things less familiar to us and underestimate risk where 
our own habits or behaviors are concerned.
So what does it mean to say that the state is entitled to safe-
guard the developmental interests of children, and what are the 
limits to preventative state intervention? How far should we go in 
the prevention- of- obesity risk? If there are genetic causes to weight 
analogous to genetic causes of height, should we begin with genetic 
screening? Should the state tell certain couples that they may not 
have children? Conversely, should couples be permitted to abort 
knowing there is a probability of inheriting a “fat gene”? Shall we 
dictate which snacks children are permitted to eat? However much 
we may lament less- than- optimal parenting habits or outcomes, 
assessing parental competence with respect to obesity without 
analogous supervision in hundreds of other less- than- optimal 
activities is question begging.
Free and plural societies must permit a wide range of lifestyle 
choices, even when some of these are probably not desirable in any 
objective sense given the known risk factors. Consider the vast 
number of parents who are divorced,2 who smoke, whose children 
play outside without sunscreen, whose children watch several 
hours of television a day, whose children attend conservative 
religious schools, whose children play contact sports. In each of 
these examples, there are known risks: of emotional distress from 
divorce, of cancer from smoking or sunbathing, of attention deficit 
from chronic television watching, of indoctrination from dogmatic 
teaching, of serious injury and death from contact sports. And lest I 
devote too much attention to supposedly harmful activities, 
consider the risks involved with activities most consider beneficial, 
such as fitness and dieting, or the ambitious pursuit of a successful 
career! Perhaps there are those who would respond by saying, “Let’s 
regulate all of these activities, too!” OK. But then do we not see 
Orwell’s specter rising?
In urging caution and restraint, I have not argued for uncon-
trolled liberty, nor have I neglected the welfare of the child. I have 
argued that interventions that aim to prevent harm circumscribe risk 
too narrowly without considering other risks that arise when 
paternalistic governments intervene. Because there are legitimate 
concerns about the integrity of the family, the use of coercive power, a 
respect for people, and the pluralism in free and democratic societies, 
interference with ordinary liberties, including those involving risk, 
must be strongly justified. Further, given the range of choices all of us 
make that have less- than- optimal outcomes, I have also suggested 
that censuring parents for obesity begs a number of questions 
concerning tolerable levels of risk. Let me close with two more 
concerns: The first is practical and the second is procedural.
First, we can all agree that paternalist state intervention in 
principle is guided by some version of the harm principle. But we 
should also remember that poorer families on average are more 
likely to purchase cheaper— hence often less healthy— food for 
themselves and their children. Little surprise, then, that obesity is 
most widespread among poorer groups. Efforts to improve 
parenting skills in themselves can do a lot of good, but proposals 
that aim to prevent obesity by calling parental competence into 
question put the responsibility on the wrong actors.
Rather than stigmatizing and penalizing parents— which is 
precisely the effect competency tests will have— why are there so 
few restrictions on what advertisers can do? Why are corporations 
that produce unhealthy food not restricted: from misleading the 
public with language like pure and natural on their factory- made 
products; from targeting young people with their advertising, 
particularly when the products have little if any nutritional value; 
from coaxing families with young children into frequenting their 
establishments by offering free toys, coupons, and playgrounds that 
make it more attractive to eat there; and finally, from allowing 
fast- food corporations inside of schools?
States also could do a lot more to structure and facilitate 
well- informed and affordable alternatives. For example, a more 
productive interventionist approach would be to heavily subsidize 
healthy food, making it much cheaper and available to all and, 
conversely, to heavily tax unhealthy food. Liberal states have a 
much longer history of doing precisely the opposite. Nutritional 
information on packaging is now standard practice in Western 
countries, and further efforts are underway to force restaurants to 
publicize the number of calories in servings of food. But states 
could also demand that products with questionable nutritional 
value be packaged with warning labels, much like tobacco products 
are, or put out of sight from the average consumer, like pornogra-
phy is. And notice that taking this approach would avoid many of 
the pitfalls of paternalism by not directly interfering with the 
liberty of ordinary citizens.4
Second, decisions about public health should be deliberated 
upon democratically. Of course the state has reasons to promote 
safety, good health, education, etc., but for its interference to be 
perceived as legitimate by a majority of society’s members, it will 
need to make its decisions in as democratic a way as possible, 
procuring the consent of the governed— particularly when many 
of the so- called offenders are vulnerable to the stigmatization that 
both precedes and follows punitive actions imposed by the state.3 
As I have already shown, interventions in liberal democratic 
societies are often decidedly harmful, even when the aim is to 
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prevent harm. Average- sized or thin people should not unilater-
ally make decisions on health in the absence of overweight people 
any more than the able- bodied should define normal functioning 
in the absence of people with disabilities, or men or heterosexuals 
should define equal treatment in the absence of women or gays 
and lesbians. When this happens, the conversation is one- sided 
and the outcomes are morally suspect. How decisions are made is 
every bit as important as which decisions are made. Failure to 
take these democratic procedures into account undermines the 
state’s legitimacy and surely guarantees abiding resentment from 
those accused of parental incompetence. If that is the outcome, 
we should expect state interventions that aim to prevent obesity 
to fail.
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Notes
1. Different sources report slightly different figures but these 
represent reliable and conservative estimates.
2. Divorce per se may leave few scars on children’s lives; much 
depends on how old the child is at the time of the divorce, how the 
couple handles the conflict, and the continuity of parental involve-
ment after the separation. The point is not that the risk factors 
associated with divorce are as certain or as automatic as, say, 
smoking, but rather that an enormous literature substantiates my 
claim that divorce brings a variety of risks.
3. This is precisely the worry that one researcher found with 
respect to a Dutch policy that aims to improve parenting. See 
Atze H. M. Van den Bos. (2010). De Overheid Achter de Voordeur: 
waar ligt de grens? Opvoedproblemen binnen de Amsterdamse 
Achter de Voordeur aanpak [The government behind the front 
door: where does the boundary lie? Childrearing problems with 
the Amsterdam- based Behind the Frontdoor approach]. 
(Unpublished master’s thesis). University of Amsterdam, 
Netherlands.
4. One recent European study found that there is widespread 
public support for three initiatives: (1) providing parents with 
more information, (2) requiring more activity in schools, and (3) 
restricting advertising. Notwithstanding isolated experiments 
that tax high-fat-content food (e.g., Denmark), public support 
remains very low. See Suggs & McIntyre (2011). 
